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PREROGATIVE POWERS: NEW LABOUR'S
FORGOTTEN CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM?
Keith Syrett"
Described by one of its chief architects as "the most ambitious and extensive
programme of constitutional reform and modernisation this century",l the Labour
government"s proposed package of constitutional change has prompted much debate
among public lawyers2 and political commentators alik~. Yet, while the new
government ostensibly seeks to "renew our politics" and criticises the retention of
"traditions well after they have outlived any useful purpose",4 its ministers continue
to conduct important affairs of state by means of prerogative powers derived from
those possessed by tile monarchy prior to tile constitutional settlement of 1688.
This article explores the themes underpinning the constitutional programme of
''New Labour", evaluating their compatibility with the royal prerogative. In the light
of an apparent unwillingness on the part of the executive to instigate reform in this
context, tile potential of Parliament and tile courts to "modernise" the prerogative
is exan1ined; and finally, methods by which such reform could be effected - should
the political will exist - are analysed.
Prerogative powers and the "Blairite constitution"
The programme of constitutional reform launched by the Labour government has
attracted some criticism from those who, while in sympathy with the changes
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Barham both for her invaluable research andfor the many lively discussions we have had on this
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L Lord Irvine ofLairg L.c., Opening Address to Conference on Constitutional Reform in
the UK, Cambridge (I7 January] 998).
2 See University of Cambridge Centre for Public Law, Constitutional Reform in the United
Kingdom: Principles and Practice (] 998).
3 See, inter alia, A. Barnett, This Time: Our Constitutional Revolution (1997); P. Riddell,
Parliament Under Press7ITe (I998), Chapter 5.
4 Labour Party, New Labour New Life for Britain (] 996), pp.3, 3].
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overall, point to the absence of a coherent statement of underlying philosophy and
ultimate objectives.5 Accordingly, it is difficult to identify a distinctive New Labour
theory of the state which might be of assistance to public lawyers in evaluating the
appropriateness of existing institutions, processes and principles within the "new
constitutional settlement" for which the Prime Minister has called.6 Nevertheless,
a munber of central, interlocking themes can be identified as informing New Labour
thinking, discourse and policy on reform of the institutions of government; and
through an analysis of these it is possible to form some conclusions on the overall
shape of the "Blairite constitution".
At the very heart of the New Labour "project" lies a philosophy of modernisation.
As the party's election manifesto makes clear, this is seen as a logical progression
from the internal changes made under Blair's leadership,7 and it now provides a
fundamental justification for key elements of the Government's programme.8
Constitutional reform - often labelled "democratic renewal,,9 - forms an integral
aspect of this, with social and economic reconstruction seen as inextricably linked
to such changes.tO The objective of modernisation thus underpins a number of the
reform proposals; this is perhaps most explicit in the case of changes to the House
of Lords and the establishment of a Select Committee on Modernisation of the
House of Conunons, but is also apparent in proposals for the "renewal of local
5 See A. Barnett, "Constitutional Possibilities" (1997) 68 Political Quarterly 361. The
nearest equivalent to a comprehensive statement of the principles underpinning the Blair
Government"s constitutional project is the Report of the Joint Consultative Committee on
Com·tilutionalReform issued by the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties in March 1997, which
interestingly recommends that "the new Government should make an early declaration setting out
the principles behind its programme of constitutional reform and outlining the more open and
modern democracy it seeks to create" (para. 86).
6 A. Blair, speech delivered in Cardiff, 15 July 1994, quoted in Barnett, 57Jpra.n.3, p.256.
7 Labour Party, New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better (1997), p.5: "We have
modernised the Labour Party and we will modernise Britain".
8 See, eg, A Mayor and Assembly for London (Cm. 3897, 1998), para. 1.5: "This
government was elected with a mandate to modernise Britain and bring our political and
administrative arrangements up to date".
9 A. Blair, "Democracy's second age", The Economist, 14 September 1996, p.33.
10 See Blair, ibid. p.3S; P. Mandelson and R. Liddle, The Blair Revolution (1996), pp.15-
16, 192.
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democratic government"," new fonns of government for Londonl2 and devolution. 13
Taken overall, the avowed intention is that "the programme will give the United
Kingdom a modern constitution fit for the 21st century". 14
A second key principle of the constitutional programme is that of
decentralisation. This is linked to the previous theme in that it rests upon a critique
of the "Old Labour" belief "in the wisdom and power of the centralised state", in
contrast to the view that "modernisation ... requires a new decentralised and
devolved style of politics".ls The creation of a Scottish Parliament and Welsh
Assembly, renewal and innovation in local government, the establishment of a
Mayor and Assembly for London and - potentially - elected regional assemblies in
EnglandI6 all reflect the belief that "there is too much power centralised in the
hands of too few people". 17
The construction and renovation of institutions which operate at a distance from
those which have traditionally governed a centralised, unitary state is symptomatic
of a broader objective of democratisation. This is partially expressed, especially in
the context of devolution and local government, as "moving decision-making closer
to the citizen",18 but it also entails a shift from "top-down" political machinery to
a "bottom-up" approach based around wider participation, consultation and public
involvement in policy-making and service delivery. Such thinking informs the use
of referenda (on government for Scotland, Wales and London); the publication of
11Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions, Consultation Paper on Local
Democracy and Community Leadership (1998), especially Chapter 1.
12 Supra. n.8, paras. Ll, 1.5, 1.7.
13 SeeA Voicefor Wales (Cm. 3718, 1997); and especially Scotland's Parliament (Cm.
3658, 1997), para. 4.2.
14 Scotland's Parliament, supra. n.13, para. 1.6
IS Mandelson and Liddle, supra. n.lO, pp.27, 16.
16 These have evidently been ruled out for the present - see A. Gray and B. Jenkins, ''New
Labour, New Government? Change and Continuity in Public Administration and Government
1997" (1998) 51 Parliamentary Affairs III at 117.
17 Joint Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reform, !mpra. n.5, para. 6.
18 A Voicefor Wales, supra. n.13, para. 3.2.
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draft legislation and greater pre-legislative scrutiny; 19 new mechanisms within local
government such as citizens" juries, deliberative opinion polls and standing citizens"
panels;20and the creation ofa "People's Panel" to involve the public in the delivery
of services and the operation of the Citizen's Charter.21Taken together with possible
electoral reform, such initiatives can be seen as pluralistic in nature, appropriate for
a government which purportedly "celebrates diversity,,22and advocates the creation
of "different centres of power" as a way to "release ... creative and innovative
energy".23 Methods by which the public can be given a voice in decision-making
also form part of a theme of citizen empowerment. This is closely linked to a
perception that the public has become disaffected with politics, partly because of its
polarised nature, and partly because "people feel no ownership, no stake in much
of the political process" since it is too remote and centralised.24 Blair has therefore
called for a "stakeholder politics"2S in which power is brought closer to people
through the policies of decentralisation discussed above. Such democratic
empowennent foons part of a move away from the individualistic, market-oriented
philosophy associated with the Conservatives towards the creation of "a modern
notion of citizenship [which] gives rights but demands obligations",26 concretely
manifested by the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into
domestic law. It is notable that New Labour rhetoric explicitly defines the public as
"citizens rather than subjects".27
A final theme, once again inextricably intertwined with each of the others, is that
19 Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons, First Report, The
Legislative Process, H.C. 190 (1997-8), paras. 19-30.
20 Supra. n.II, Chapter 4.
21 See Cabinet Office news release, announcing launch of "Service First" to replace
Citizen's Charter programme, 30 June 1998.
22 Mandelson and Liddle, .mpra. n.l 0, p.197.
23 A. Blair, New Britain (1996), p.312.
24 Idem.
2S Ibid. Chapter 36.
26 Ibid. p.218.
27 Mandelson and Liddle, s71pra. n.l 0, p.210.
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of accountability. 28New participatory mechanisms offer "citizens" the opportunity
to hold national and local government to account, as welI as articulating their views;
while devolution proposals are explicitly justified as a means of "extending
democratic accountability"29 and "addressing the democratic deficit'~o To these
policies should be added proposed freedom of information legislation, the objective
of which is stated as "to encourage more open and accountable government";31 and
a manifesto promise to review ministerial accountability "so as to remove recent
abuses",32 evidently underpinned by the view t11at"there is little or no genuine
accountability to Parliament for ministers' actions".3]
It should be apparent, even from this relatively cursory analysis, that the
continued existence and use of prerogative powers by government is fundamentally
at odds Witll New Labour thinking on constitutional issues. The most striking
contradiction is surely between the rhetoric and policies of "modernisation" and the
antiquity of the prerogative, as the common law "residue" of powers fonnerly
possessed by the monarchy "from the time of the Norman Conquest down to ilie
Revolution of 1688".34It is difficult to see how a goverrunent employing a discourse
of "democratic renewal", embedded within a forceful critique of ilie anachronism
of many political institutions/5 can justify activities taken under such a source of
auiliority.
Prerogative powers conflict with the New Labour "project" in several oilier
respects. Originating in the monarchy, and now exercised primarily by ministers in
the name of the Crown, iliey epitomise the "top-down" tradition which has
characterised British constitutional struchrre, in which "real power continues to flow
28 See especially Joint Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reform, supra. n.5, para.
4: "Democratic government should ensure that those who hold power in the name of the people
are accountable to the collective wishes and interests of the people".
29 Supra. n.14, para. 6.2.
30 Supra. n.18, para 1.4.
31 YourRighttoKnow(Cm. 3818,1997), para. 1.2.
32 Supra. n.7, p.33. A revised Ministerial Code was issued in July 1997.
33 Mandelson and Liddle, .\7Ipra. n.lO, p. 188.
34 A. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), p.42!.
3S See particularly Blair, .\7Ipra. n.9, p.33; Mandelson and Liddle, supra. n.10, pp.183-9.
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from the top of the pyramid to its base".36The powers are centralised in the hands
of a few members of the executive (and particularly the Prime Minister) at the apex
of the political system, thus violating notions of pluralism and diffusion of power.
The prerogative is "democratised" only in the limited sense that most powers are
vested in ministers elected every four or five years by universal franchise; there is
no element of popular participation in particular activities taken under its authority -
hence "citizen empowerment" in tins context is negligible, especially given the close
connection between the prerogative and subjecthood,37 which seems inappropriate
to modern notions of citizenship.38 Finally, as tile next section of this article will
show, accountability for the exercise ofthese powers is very limited, resulting in a
"democratic deficit" seen by critics as highly significant because of the importance
of many of the functions carried out under the authority of the prerogative.39
However, despite its evident incompatibility with New Labour thinking, reform
of the royal prerogative does not currently fonn part of the Government's
programme.40This was confirmed by the Prime Minister himself when, in reply to
a written question from a Liberal Democrat MP as to plans "to increase democratic
involvement and accOlmtability"in areas of government covered by the prerogative,
he stated fuat "there are no plans at present to legislate on matters dealt with under
the royal prerogative".41 Indeed, New Labour has already shown its willingness to
use one particular prerogative power - that of management and regulation of fue civil
service - to political advantage, both in reversing the most controversial exercise of
36R. Austin, "Administrative Law's Reaction to the Changing Concepts of Public Service"
in P. Leyland and T. Woods (eds.), Administrative Law Facing the Future (1997), p.9.
37 See 1. Chitty, A treatise on the law qf the prerogatives qf the Crown (1820), p.iii: "The
prerogative is not the iron tie of unbridled power: it holds the subject in the silken chain of mild
subjection".
38 See C. Vincenzi, Crown Powers. Sll~iects and Citizens (1998), pp.2-3.
39 For a discussion of the range of prerogative powers, see 8 Ha/sbury 's Laws (4th ed.,
1974), para. 889ft Among the most significant and controversial are those of patronage; "keeping
the Queen's peace"; defence of the realm and emergency powers; the conduct of foreign and
diplomatic affairs (including treaty-making, declarations of war and peace and the issue of
passports); management and regulation of the civil service; the appointment of the Prime Minister
and the summoning and dissolution of Parliament; and the prerogative of mercy.
40 Save where such reform is incidental to specific issues which may be addressed by
legislation; for example, on the civil service - see infra. n.97 and text.
41 Official Report (B.C.) 12 March 1998, vol. 307, col. WA 279.
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this power by the Thatcher government,42 and in making contentious appointments
of special advisors to Downing Street. 43
Such a stance contrasts sharply with previous Labour pronouncements on the
issue - notably the rather vague commitment in the last election manifesto to "end
ministerial misuse of the Royal Prerogative",44 the position taken by the party's
National Policy Forum,45 and (perhaps most significantly from a "New Labour"
standpoint) the comments of the present Home Secretary in 1994 that "the royal
prerogative has no place in a modem western democracy ... we should aim for a
situation where all powers exercised by the executive, and by the monarch, are
based upon statute".46 It seems apparent that, while the transition from "Old" to
"New" Labour may have been marked by an increasing radicalism on many
constitutional matters, refonn of prerogative powers47 is no longer considered a
subject worthy of political debate or of Parliamentary time.48
Parliament and the courts: mitigating the democratic deficit?
42 By restoring the right to union membership at G.C.H.Q. - see Official Report (H.C.) 19
May 1997, vol. 294, cols. WA 13-14.
43 An amendment to the Civil Service Order in Council 1982 allowed Alistair Campbell
and Jonathan Powell to undertake executive responsibilities previously performed by civil
servants: see Official Report (H.c.), 2 June 1997, vol. 295, col. WA 96 .
44 Labour Party, It's time to get Britain working again (1992), p.24.
45 A New Agendafor Democracy (1993).
46 J. Straw, "Abolish the Royal Prerogative" in A. Barnett (ed.), Power and the Throne
(1994), pp.125, 128.
47 This is despite the evidence of a survey reported in the Sunday Times ("Labour MPs
want debate on monarchy", 14 September 1997), which showed 39% of Labour backbenchers
in favour of reform of the prerogative.
48 Most recently, the independent think-tank Demos, regarded as influential upon New
Labour thinking and policy, has proposed a depoliticisation of the monarchy. As part of such
reform, a Monarchy Act would be passed, transferring residual political powers away from the
monarchy to a number of other institutions: see T. Hames and M. Leonard, Modernising the
Monarchy (1998), pp. 23-6. The Demos proposals focus upon those areas in which the monarch
continues to have a personal role in constitutional matters, rather than the wider issue of
executive actions taken under the authority of the prerogative; nevertheless, it is worthy of note
that the government has sought to distance itselffrom them - see "Blairite group seeks vote on
Do we want King Charles?", The Times, 7 September 1998.
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It appears, therefore, that there is a substantial contradiction between the
continued existence and exercise of ministerial powers derived from the royal
prerogative and many of the central principles underpinning Labour's constitutional
project; yet refonn of this area of the constitution does not presently seem to fonn
part of the Government's plans. In view of the executive's reluctance or
unwillingness to act in this area, it may be asked whether either of the other
branches of government, as presently constituted, are capable of responding to the
usage of prerogative powers in a manner which might render them more compatible
with the modernised constitutional settlement seemingly envisaged by the Blair
administration.
(a) Parliament
Parliamentary oversight of the exercise of prerogative power is limited by a number
of factors. The effectiveness of scrutiny of prerogative action - as with all other
exercises of ministerial authority - is severely constrained by party loyalty, enforced
through the whip system. Individual ministerial responsibility for decisions made
under statute or the prerogative has been described as containing elements of
"ambiguity and confusion",49with the ultimate sanction of resignation only enforced
when the support of the Prime Minister and parliamentary colleagues is lost; while
answerability to Parliament is circmnscribed by ministerial control over infonnation
which enables a selective account of decisions and events to be constructed, despite
the provisions of the Ministerial Code.50 These weaknesses are exacerbated by the
lack of time available for debates and questions both on the floor of the House and
in Select Committee.
These are familiar criticisms of Parliament's inability to hold the executive to
account. However, the role of the legislature in respect of prerogative powers is
even more heavily circumscribed than the foregoing discussion suggests. Many of
the functions perfonned by government under the authority of the prerogative, such
as matters relating to defence of the realm and international diplomacy, are
politically sensitive by their very nature and are accordingly unlikely to be the
subjects of full account in Parliament. Moreover, Erskine May lists a number of
49 Public Service Committee of the House of Commons, Ministerial Accountability and
Responsibility, He 313-1 (I995-6), para. 2.
so The obligation of ministers to provide full and accurate information to Parliament lay,
of course, at the heart of the Scott Inquiry: see A. Tomkins, "Government Information and
Parliament: Misleading by Design or by Default?" [1996] P.L..472.
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topics falling within the prerogative, upon which, by convention, questions may not
be raised.51 The result of this is that disclosure of infonnation on the exercise of
prerogative powers may be minimal. 52
Parliament is, therefore, severely constrained in its ability to become involved in
the exercise of prerogative powers. Such weakness is, of course, highly
advantageous to government and provides an incentive to utilise prerogative, as
opposed to statutory powers, since they will be subject to reduced scrutiny, both
before and after the decision or action.53For its part, however, there seems to be
little prospect of the legislature taking the initiative to "democratise" the prerogative.
In the absence of government support, the opportunities for backbench MPs to
initiate legislation to curtail the prerogative are scarce and the chances of success
almost nil;54while it is undoubtedly significant that the most recent Commons debate
on the general use of prerogative powers took place on an adjournment motion at
2:20am.55 Furthennore, although there have been calls for investigation of the
prerogative by Select Committee, 56 no such action has been takerr7 - moreover, it
is questionable whether any such review is likely to be wholly effective, especially
given the government's ability to control the release of infonnation.58 All that
51 Parliamentary Practice (21 st ed., ed. C. Boulton, 1989), p.288.
52 See a Parliamentary statement by the former Prime Minister: "it is for individual
Ministers to decide on a particular occasion whether and how to report to Parliament on the
exercise of prerogative powers" : Official Report (H.e.) 1 March 1993, vol. 220, col. WA 19.
53 See A. LeSeuer and M. Sunkin, Public Law (1997), p. 270. Such an analysis is,
unsurprisingly, not shared by those in ministerial office - see Official Report (H.C.) 21 April 1993,
vol. 223, cols. 487-492.
54 See the discussion of the Commonwealth of Britain Bill, infra. n.86 and text.
55 Official Report (H.e.) 21 April 1993, vol. 223, cols. 485-492.
56 Ibid. col. 487.
57 It is unclear whether issues relating to the prerogative will fall within the purview of the
new Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons. During the debate upon
its inception, it was stated merely that the Committee would examine the means by which
Ministers were held to account: Official Report (H.e.) 22 May 1997, vol. 294, col. 907.
58 Particularly pertinent in this context is the Select Committee investigation into the
banning of trade unions at G.e.H.Q .. The government refused to permit the director ofG.C.H.Q.
and a union representative to give evidence - see Employment Committee, First Report, HC 238
(1983-4), paras. 6-7; and further LeSeuer and Sunkin, f>11pra. n.53, Chapter 17.
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Parliament can realistically achieve, given the dominance of an executive anxious
to retain and use its prerogative powers, is a very weak fonn of scrutiny of actions
taken under the authority of the prerogative once they have already occurred.
(b) The courts
In recent years, the courts have shown a willingness to subject the exercise of
prerogative powers to increased judicial oversight. The G.c.H.Q. case59 established
that decisions taken under the authority of the prerogative were in principle
reviewable upon the same basis as those made by virtue of statute; and in a number
of subsequent cases, the courts have been prepared to investigate the manner in
which prerogative powers are exercised.60 The crucial factor now detennining
whether a governmental decision or action is reviewable is not the source of the
power - there is no "logical reason why the fact that the source of the power is the
prerogative and not statute should today deprive the citizen of that right of challenge
to the manner of its exercise which he would possess were the source of the power
statutory";61 but whether the subject matter involved is of such nature as to be
justiciable.62
In expanding the reach of judicial review to cover the manner of exercise of the
prerogative, the courts may be seen to be demonstrating an awareness of the
necessity to modernise and render properly accountable this source of executive
power - for example, in the G.C.H.Q. case, Lord Roskill expressed concern that the
development of administrative law might be hampered by "harking back to ... the
clanking of medieval ghosts of the past" and criticised the "source" test of
reviewability on the basis that both statutory and prerogative actions were executive
acts and therefore that "to talk of that act as the act of the sovereign savours of the
59 Couneil of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [] 985] A.C. 374.
60 E.g. R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Everett
[]989] QB 8] 1; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Bentley [1994] QB
349; R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex parte P [1995] ] All E.R. 870; R vMinistry
of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] ] All E.R. 257 (C.A.). For a discussion of the role of the courts
in this area, see D. Pollard, "Judicial Review of the Prerogative in the United Kingdom and
France" in Leyland and Woods, !mpra. n.36, pp.297-309.
61 Lord Roskill, !mpra. n.59 at 4]7.
62 Lord Scarman, ibid. at 407.
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archaism of past centuries".63
The growth of judicial activism in this context is also underpinned by a general
perception of the inadequacies of Parliament as a check upon the executive,
characterised by the present Lord Chancellor's extra-judicial statement that "the
consequences of the "democratic deficit" ... have been, to an important degree,
mitigated by the rigours of judicial review",64 and echoed by several other senior
members of the judiciary65 and academic commentators~6 In the specific case of
prerogative powers, the clearest exposition of a role for the courts in compensating
for the shortcomings of Parliament appears in the dissenting judgment of Lord
Mustill in the Fire Brigades Union case:
"In recent years ... the employment in practice of... specifically Parliamentary
remedies has on occasion been perceived as falling short, and sometimes well
short, of what was needed to bring the performance of the executive into line with
the law and with the minimum standards of fairness implicit in every
Parliamentary delegation of a decision-making function. To avoid a vacuum in
which the citizen would be left without protection against a misuse of executive
powers the courts have had no option but to occupy the dead ground in a manner,
and in areas of public life, which could not have been foreseen 30 years ago".67
Clearly, therefore, the potential exists for the courts to utilise the judicial review
jurisdiction in such a way as to alleviate the lack of accOlmtability which attaches
6J Supra. n.59 at 417. Compare the approach of the Court of Appeal in R v Secretary of
State for the Home Department, ex parte Northumbria Police Authority [1988] I All E.R. 556,
in which authority for the existence of a prerogative of "keeping the peace" was traced back to
the Proclamation of Humbert Walter the Justiciar (1195) and the Statute of Winchester (1285) -
see Purchas L.J. at 566.
64 Lord Irvine of Lairg QC, "Judges and Decision-Makers: The Theory and Practice of
Wednesbury Review" [1996] P.L. 59.
65 E.g. Sir 1. Laws, "Judicial Remedies and the Constitution" (I994) 57 M.L.R. 223; Sir
S. Sedley, "Governments, Constitutions and Judges" in G. Richardson and H. Genn (eds.),
Administrative Law and Government Action (1994).
66 See M. Radford, "Mitigating the Democratic Deficit? Judicial Review and Ministerial
Accountability" in Leyland and Woods, !>7tpra.n.36; G. Ganz, "Criminal Injuries Compensation:
the Constitutional Issue" (1996) 59 M.L.R 95.
67 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Fire Brigades Union [1995]
2 All E.R. 244 at 268.
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to the exercise of prerogative powers, and by so doing, to render this area of
executive action more modernised and transparent. Indeed, the increasingly
interventionist approach of the courts in this context and elsewhere has led some to
discern the emergence of a "surrogate political process'XiSfunction for judicial
review, in which individuals and groups dissatisfied with, or excluded from,
conventional political channels, can articulate issues and concerns which are not
otherwise addressed.69 If this assessment is accepted, judicial review would seem
to represent a viable mechanism for "opening up" acts taken under the authority of
the prerogative to scrutiny, debate and - to a limited extent - participation by the
public,70 in a manner which is largely unachievable through the Parliamentary
process.
Yet it is surely important not to overstate the capability of the courts to
"democratise" and "modernise" the prerogative. While the familiar assessment of
judicial review as "sporadic and peripheral" may now require qualification in the
light of the considerable increase in its incidence in recent years,71 it remains the
case that its contribution to the control of central government and the development
of constitutional principle is necessarily limited by the relatively small number of
cases which come to court.72In the context of the prerogative, the role of judicial
review is likely to be further restricted by the nature of the powers, which confer
very general discretion upon ministers and which lack the "objectives" which can
be discerned when a decision or action taken tmder statutory authority is challenged.
68 The phrase is that ofR. Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law",
(1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 1667 at 1670.
69 See particularly D. Oliver, "Underlying Values of Public Law" in M. Taggart (ed.), The
Province of Administrative Law (1997), p.241: "the courts are taking on a role as a forum for
political debate and settlement of disputes with a political dimension - a Grand Inquest of the
Nation forum - in response to the increasingly obvious inability and unwillingness of the House
of Commons to do so".
70 For a discussion of the restricted role of judicial review in enhancing participation, see
P. Craig, Public Law alldDemocracy in the United Kingdom and the United States of America
(1990), pp.16]-2.
7] See S. de Smith, H. Woolf and J. Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (5th
ed., 1995), paras. ]-002 and 1-033.
72 It is argued by L. Bridges, G. Meszaros and M. Sunkin (in Judicial Review in
Perspective (1995), p.ll) that "the volume of judicial review litigation is tiny by contrast to the
scale of administrative decision making", with challenges to central government amounting to just
over 25% of the total (ibid. pAl).
122
PREROGATIVE POWERS AND NEW LABOUR
The consequence of this is that it may be more difficult for the courts to justify
intervention, particularly on grOlmdsof "irrationality",73 although it is clear from ex
parte Smith that this ground is available.74 It has also been argued that the absence
of an underlying philosophy of administrative law and an overriding statement of
individual rights to which the courts can have recourse in judicial review cases "has
left our courts singularly ill-equipped to adjudicate effectively on the use of
prerogative powers".?5 In this context, the imminent incorporation of the European
Convention on Human Rights into domestic law may offer a framework allowing a
more coherent rationale for judicial intervention to be developed.76
The speech of Lord Mustill in the Fire Brigades Union case points to further
difficulties entailed by the assumption of such a role by the courts, supplementing
Labour's constitutional reform project. His Lordship stressed the need for sensitivity
on the part of the "parliamentarian, admini strator and judge if the delicate balance
of the unwritten mles evolved ... in recent years is not to be disturbed";?7 while Lord
Irvine has similarly called for "judicial self-restraint" to be shown.78These remarks
clearly indicate the reluctance of the judiciary to violate the doctrine of the
separation of powers, especially in areas which have a high policy content, as will
be the case with many exercises of the prerogative.?9They demonstrate a discomfort
with the principle - upon which any judicial involvement in "modernising" the
73 G.c.H.Q., supra. n.59 at 410-411 (Lord Diplock).
?4 Supra. n.60. The Court of Appeal found, however, that the threshold of irrationality had
not been crossed in this case (see Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. at 266).
75 Vincenzi, s1/pra. n.38, p.60.
76 For a discussion of a "rights" -based approach to judicial review, see F. Donson, "Civil
Liberties and Judicial Review: Can the Common Law Really Protect Rights?" in Leyland and
Woods, supra. n.36.
77 Supra. n.67 at 268.
78 Supra. n.64 at 75-8.
79 A number of executive functions under the prerogative have been held by the courts to
be non-justiciable - see G.c.H.Q., supra. n.59 at 418 (Lord Roskill); ex parte Everett, S1lpra.
n.60 at 820 (Taylor L.J.) - the effect being to preclude judicial intervention in these areas.
However, in ex parte Smith [1995] 4 All E.R. 427 (Q.B.D.) at 446, Simon Brown L.J. stated that
"only the rarest cases will today be ruled strictly beyond the court's purview"; although the
greater the policy content of a decision, the more hesitant a court will be in holding it to be
irrational - see supra. n.60 at 264 (Sir Thomas Bingham M.R.).
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prerogative would seem to depend - that the courts should strive to enhance the
quality of democracy within the political system; an approach which is rendered
highly problematic both by the lack of democratic legitimacy of an unelected
judiciary and by unequal access to the judicial review process.80
Reform of the prerogative
For the reasons outlined above, it seems unlikely that Parliament will be in a
position to reform the prerogative in the absence of government support for such a
move; while the ability of the courts to do so is restricted and the constitutional
appropriateness of such action highly questionable. Accordingly, it would appear
that there is little chance of reform as long as the government remains uncommitted.
However, speculation as to the possible fonn of any changes to prerogative powers
remains a valuable exercise, not least because it is important to draw a distinction
between proposals of a radical nature and those which are perhaps more readily
achievable, should the Labour position on this issue alter.
Labour's unwillingness to refonn the royal prerogative contrasts starkly with
proposals advanced by the Liberal Democrats. This is of particular interest, given
the co-operation between the two parties on constitutional matters, reflected in the
establishment of a Joint Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reform prior to
the election,8l and subsequent Liberal Democrat representation on the Cabinet sub-
committee on the constitution. The party proposes a set of reforms which are radical
in that the ultimate objective is the drawing up of a written constitution, which will
come into effect following a referendum; however, as a preliminary step it is
envisaged that a Reform Bill covering the "key issues of constitutional reform" will
be enacted.82The Bill provides that certain defined areas of the royal prerogative -
the ratification of treaties, the dissolution of Parliament and the choice of the Prime
80 See R. Cotterrell, "Judicial Review and Legal Theory" in Richardson and Genn, supra.
n.6S, p.18; LeSeuer and Sunkin, !mpra. n.S3, pA8!. Discussing the Fire Brigades Union case,
Ganz concludes that "when the unelected judiciary feel obliged to repair the malfunctioning of the
democratic process there is something badly wrong with the state of our democracy", supra. n.66
at 100.
8] Supra. n.S.
82 Liberal Democrats, TheReform Bill 1997.
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Minister - shall be abolished and taken over by Parliament. 83Remaining areas of the
prerogative will also be abolished, with "all executive powers [being] derived from
the constitution or from laws passed by the appropriate legislature".84 0 the r
proposals seeking to address the issue of prerogative powers also do so in the
broader context of the creation of a written constitution. One of the most vociferous
campaigners for the reform of the prerogative has been Tony Benn, for whom it is
a necessary concomitant of republicanisation. On the basis that "the House of
Commons is the only elected part of Parliament and democratic principles should
require that all prerogative powers be controlled by that House",85 Benn's
Commonwealth of Britain Bill86provided for the ending of the constitutional status
of the Crown87and the transfer of powers presently exercised under the authority of
the prerogative to a President acting subsequent to a resolution of the House of
Commons.88 The Bill offered a list of such powers, together with a "residual"
provision allowing the President "to exercise other executive powers not conferred
by statute",89 and required prerogative instruments of a legislative character to be
brought in as Bills, with those of an administrative nature being laid before the
House of Commons for approval.90
Similarly, the draft constitution produced by the Institute of Public Policy
Research,91 while retaining the monarch as Head of State, established the
constitution as the sole foundation for all executive power, thereby abolishing the
residue of prerogative powers.92 Certain situations presently governed by the
83 Clauses 3, 5 and 6 respectively. Provision is made for a fixed Parliamentary term off our
years (clause 4), but dissolution may also be voted for subsequent to a vote of no confidence.
84 Liberal Democrats, Constitutional Declaration (1996), article 5(1).
8S T. Benn and A. Hood, Common Sense (1993), pp.45-6.
86 H.c. Bill 103 (1992-3). The Bill was not moved on Second Reading.
87 Ibid. clause 37.
88 Ibid. clauses 14 (1) (a) and (b).
89 Ibid. clause 14 (1) (c).
90 Ibid. clauses 14 (2) and (3).
91 The Constitution of the United Kingdom (1991).
92 Ibid. article I.
125
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
prerogative were defined and made subject to Parliamentary approval;93while the
government was given a residual executive power to act within the provisions of the
constitution.94
It is, of course, inevitable that any programme of constitutional reform based
around the creation of a written constitution would need to cater for the significant
executive powers currently exercised by virtue of the prerogative and, given the
"democratic deficit" previously identified, it is equally unsurprising that all of the
projects outlined above envisage improved mechanisms of accountability, whether
to Parliament or to the judicial organs entrusted with oversight of the constitution.
However, it does not follow from this that reform of the prerogative can only be
achieved within the framework of a written constitutional document.95 It would be
perfectly possible to enact ordinary legislation covering such matters so that
authorisation for executive activity in these areas derived from statute, rather than
the COlmnonlaw; indeed, as Lord Browne-Wilkinson observed in the Fire Brigades
Union case, "the constitutional history of this country is the history of the
prerogative powers of the Crown being made subject to the overriding powers of the
democratically elected legislature as the sovereign body".96
Reform ofthis type would be of a gradual, "step by step" nature, with particular
categories of prerogative power progressively receiving Parliamentary attention. In
the present climate, the nmction most likely to be given statutory authorisation
would appear to be regulation of the civil service, with future legislation in this field
having been endorsed by the Joint Consultative Committee,97 and in the Commons
by the Minister for Public Service.98 The proposed Civil Service Act would give
statutory basis to the existing Civil Service Code and Orders in Council, and could
93 E.g. treaty-making (article 51); declarations of war and the deployment of armed forces
(articles 122 and 123); national security (article 126) and declarations of emergency (article 128).
94 Ibid. article 40.
95 A similar argument is advanced in the Demos pamphlet, supra. n.48, p.2S, which
observes that "the perceived difficulties associated with the drafting of a single written
constitution should not serve as the pretext for avoiding the depoliticisation of the monarchy".
96 Supra. n.67 at 2S4.
97 Supra. n.5, para. 84.
98 Official Report (H.C.) 4 June 1997, vol. 295, col. 375.
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provide for the express abolition of the prerogative in this context.99
Other areas of the prerogative which could be relatively easily "translated" into
statute might include the ratification of treaties, for which a model is already
available in the form of Lord Lester's Treaties (parliamentary Approval) Bill;loOand
the issue of passports, particularly in view of the acknowledgment by the previous
government that "refusal of passport facilities to United Kingdom nationals is
confmed to certain well defined categories ... although the issue of passports is a
discretionary power under the royal prerogative, it is as constrained as any statutory
power might be". 101Situations where government may need to respond rapidly and
flexibly to events, such as declaration of warl02 or the "prerogative of keeping the
Queen's peace within the reahn",103present somewhat greater difficulty, especially
since it is difficult to anticipate every evenhlality which might arise, but could be
addressed within statutes granting "the executive enhanced powers, broad discretion
to act and respond to the exigencies of the situation and ability to legislate
further". 104
Various objections might be raised to such a programme of reform. Perhaps the
most familiar of these is based upon the impracticability of defining the precise
scope and extent of the prerogative, given its residual nahlre, and the "complexity"
of the relationship between statutory and prerogative powers. This has been used by
ministers as a justification for refusing to enumerate the number of actions taken
tmder its authority, and therefore implicitly to resist calls for reform. 105The argument
99 FDA News (July 1997, p.2), quoted in K. Theakston, "New Labour, New Whitehall?"
(1998) 13Public Policy and Administration 13 at 24. For further discussion, see N. Lewis, "A
Civil Service Act for the United Kingdom" [1998] P.L. 463.
100 H.L. Bill 27 (1995-6).
101 e. Wardle, Official Report (H.e.) 21 April 1993, vol. 223, col. 489. It should also be
noted that Directive 68/3601EEC gives European Union citizens the right to be issued with an
identity card or passport valid for travel through and between member states.
102 A prerogative power specifically pinpointed in Straw's call for reform, supra. n.46,
p.126.
103 As in the Northumbria Police Authority case, .\1Ipra. n.63.
104 D. Bonner, Emergency Powers in Peacetime (1985), p.l0.
lOS See OfficialReport (H.e.) 21 April 1993, vol. 223, col. 490; personal communication
by letter from Cabinet Office (12 March 1997); both citing A. Bradley and K. Ewing,
Constitutional and Administrative Law (now 12th ed., 1997), p.274.
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which flows from this is that, because prerogative powers cannot easily be
catalogued, "there is no sensible option of a blanket approach"106which could catch
all of the powers; and in view of this the status quo is preferable. It is submitted that
this reasoning is disingenuous; as previously observed, there is no difficulty with
isolating particular areas of the prerogative which might be the subject of legislative
reform - problems of defining its overall scope should not be used to justify a refusal
to address these functions. It is true that dealing with the "residue" of prerogative
powers not otherwise given statutory basis is more problematic, but it should be
possible to draft legislation abolishing all remaining royal prerogativesI07 (without
providing a list, which could prove incomplete and allow the prerogative to
"resurface" in a particular area) and requiring government to derive legal authority
for those acts and decisions not otherwise covered by statutory provision from such
an Act. Although legislation of this type cannot be entrenched under present
constitutional arrangements, political and public opinion is surely likely to render it
all but immune from repeal.
Arguably, a more telling criticism of a project which seeks to give statutory basis
to prerogative powers is that it will make little difference in practice to the manner
in which those powers are exercised. On this analysis, the need to provide
government with very wide discretionary powers, particularly in "emergency"
situations, severely limits scmtiny of executive action, whether by Parliament or the
courts. lOS Moreover, Parliamentary oversight of ministerial activity, even under
statutory authority, is likely to remain weak as long as executive dominance of the
legislature persists. The grip of the executive needs to be loosened - either by means
of electoral reform, to reduce the chance of one party holding an overwhelming
106 Wardle, supra. n.IOl, col. 492.
107 Express statutory abolition of the prerogative in the defined areas discussed above
would also seem to be required, given the reluctance of the courts to hold that a power has been
abolished by implication (see the Northllmbria Police Authority case, !mpra. n. 63), coupled with
the absence of a doctrine of extinction of such powers by long disuse: see Vincenzi, supra. n.38,
pp.24-5.
lOS Indeed, it might be argued that the courts presently take a "harder look" at executive
actions based upon ancient prerogatives than they would at those which might be taken under the
authority of a broadly-worded modern-day statute, duly passed by a democratic legislature -
hence, statutory enactment might actually reduce the likelihood of successful challenge in judicial
review. Such a view, however, would seem to underestimate the willingness of the courts to
compensate for the inadequacies of Parliamentary scrutiny of executive activity, whatever its legal
authority: see !mpra. n.64 and text.
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majority; or by reform of Parliament itself, especially the whip system.
Clearly, there is considerable validity in this critique; however, a number of points
may be raised in response. Firstly, the enactment of legislation covering various
areas of the prerogative would itself provide a valuable opportunity to examine and
debate the nature and extent of the powers claimed by the executive. Secondly, any
legislation so passed could contain provisions granting Parliament a greater degree
of involvement in particular executive decisions and acts subsequently taken under
its authority, perhaps on the model of the Treaties (parliamentary Approval) Bill,
which provided for affirmative resolution of each House of Parliament in particular
circumstances,109 with negative procedure applicable in other cases. This would
provide an opportunity for concerned tv1Ps to require ministers to justify their
actions, although in the absence of any reforms to strengthen the position and
independence of the legislature, the likelihood of defeating the government must
remain minimal. Finally, and most significantly, while placing these powers on a
statutory footing might not necessarily render executive accountability to the courts
or Parliament completely comprehensive, it would at least endow them with the
democratic legitimacy which the royal prerogative lacks.
Conclusion
This last-mentioned factor alone would seem to be good enough reason for a
government which is purportedly committed to democratisation and modernisation
to grasp the nettle of refonn of the prerogative. While total transparency,
accountability and participation in respect of the exercise of these powers may
remain elusive goals, legislative enactment - without the need to go as far as the
drawing up of a written constitution, which is not part of the Blairite reform agenda -
offers the opportunity for a democratically-elected body to scrutinise and recast
these ancient common law powers in a manner appropriate to the creation of a
"constitution for the future, not the past". 110 At present, however, there seems little
sign that even a reform-minded executive is willing to abjure the considerable
advantages it gains from the possession of vague, flexible and largely unaccountable
prerogative powers.
109 I. e. where treaties affect existing laws or private rights, affect the taxpayer or cede
territory: supra n.lOO,clauses 3(1) and (2).
110 Joint Consultative Committee on Constitutional Reform, 51Jpra. N.5, para. 14.
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